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The Lawyers. MARTIN MAYER. New York: Harper 8c Row. 1967. Pp.

xviii, 586. $8.95.
Mr. Mayer, turning his attention and his ample talents from Wall
Street; Men and Money and Madison Avenue, USA to the great public
profession, has produced a big, brilliant, and ambitious book. Too
ambitious, perhaps. Its style is semi-light and its profusion of quotations impressive, although on closer look many of them are pretty old
and the same sources are used over and over again-too much reliance
on sometimes casual observations of too few people, it would seem.
This is not a solid study or a political science text marking out the
place and work of lawyers in our society. Much of it is impressionistic,
descending at times almost to mere gossip. Yet it contains many penetrating insights. It reads well on almost every page, and is a bright and
attractive miscellany of information about laws, lawyers, law schools,
and courts. But in the end its very ambition is overweening and selfdefeating. No one volume can hope to limn adequately the 300,000
American lawyers and their infinitely varied activities, any more than
any single book could paint a complete picture of the American clergy
or of American college professors. Such a work, however skilled its
writing, is bound to be spotty and episodic, leaving the reader vaguely
dissatisfied. The lay reader of The Lawyers will acquire a lot of information and the lawyer reader will get new starts for reflections about
his craft. But it remains that the book covers too much and tries too
hard.
To this reviewer's taste the author did best in the forty-five pages
he devoted to the law schools, searching out their strengths and weaknesses with a practiced and fairly accurate eye. Law school instruction,
especially in the first year, is, he asserts, "more intense and more intelligent teaching than is offered in any other variety of academic
institution in the United States"'-a bold and sweeping statement indeed. (The author seems to have visited only a few of the law schools.)
But what he seems to mean is that the new law student is required to
do more work and more intensive work than in his undergraduate
college and that the better law teachers force their students to think
analytically and express themselves clearly, to "think like lawyers"-in short, to prepare themselves for intellectual and community leadership.
Mr. Mayer gives us, too, a brief but useful history of legal education in England and America, an adequate discussion of the case
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method, some traditional anecdotes about famous law professors, and
a glimpse of the slow-but-steady changes in teaching methods and
materials. Quite correctly, he notes that law students work hard and
live together, that there is a surprising dearth of Negro applicants, and
that law schools operating only at night have almost disappeared. Evening or late-afternoon classes at the better schools had become respectable, but most night sessions are now being phased out, probably
because prosperity plus the availability of grants and loans make it
possible for most students to attend daytime classes and spend the rest
of the day hours (and many night hours) in reading and study.
Like this reviewer, Mr. Mayer takes a dim view of bar examinations, though of course a case can be made for such tests in a state with
several schools. It is more difficult to concur with the author's statement that in the law schools "the bottom has been eliminated." No
one familiar with the problems inherent in selective admission systems will deny that every school makes plenty of mistakes and that
such mistakes are sometimes irremediable. Agreement there must be
with our author's reluctant conclusion that, despite the vast improvements in law school training, "the problem of the law school is that
startlingly little is known systematically about the real world of the
lawyer... "2 But the writer of a book like this has a similar problem.
Since the world of the lawyer is as large as society, it is absurd to ask
the law school to know all about, and to train for, every kind of
lawyer activity. Much more emphasis is being placed today on direct
preparation for professional practice, and one suspects from the scanty
description of modern "practice courses" in today's law schools that
the author has not visited Cornell.
The brief chapter on "Jurisprudence," while not exactly a disaster,
is so skimpy and simplistic that omission might have been wiser. But
when he writes about the law and "People"-criminal cases, personal
injury claims, justice and the poor, etc.-Martin Mayer is witty and
human, compassionate and understanding. Here he seems to have
talked to just the right people (including Harris Steinberg, advocate
extraordinary, who must, however, have been taken aback by the double entendre "not quite so sober"3 ). The author really got down to the
basics of crime prosecution in this country, learning at least three
things few laymen know: first, that a prime function of police and
prosecutors is the intelligent and selective refusal to prosecute; 4 sec2 P. 118.
S-P. 156.
4 See D.
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ond, that all but a small percentage of those who are actually prosecuted either plead guilty or are convicted;, and third, that negotiated
guilty pleas are not only legitimate but also essential to reasonably
prompt disposition of criminal charges. The whole system of plea bargaining is nowhere better explained and justified than in this book. It
is interesting, too, that Mayer learned what few lawyers and no newspaper or magazine commentators seemed to know in 1963, that Gideon
v. Wainwright5 made no new law at all in most of the states and that
-in most states lawyers had been provided for indigent defendants for
many decades before Gideon's case.
The book's whole treatment of "criminal justice" is sympathetic
and understanding. When Martin Mayer writes about the human side
of an institution he is a master of insight and appreciation. His treatment of the Escobedo-Mirandadevelopments is superb. As an intelligent layman, he senses the incongruity of the modem efforts to exclude
questioning of the accused, which in itself has been a staple of AngloAmerican judicial procedure for centuries. Judges and law professors
who have never come into real contact with investigations of crime,
but who are highly articulate, make it appear that it is essentially
dangerous to let a man admit his guilt, indeed, that there is something
socially undesirable about proving guilt. Policemen, less articulate but
more involved, experienced, and conscious of their responsibility for
public order, are frustrated and embittered by judicial decisions that
they believe unreasonably limit them in carrying out their duties.
Sometime, someone has to resolve this conflict.
The surveys of personal injury law practice and litigation and of
the burgeoning poverty programs are timely and penetrating. Eyebrows
rise a little, however, at the calm and casual statement that "[a]t least
two large insurance companies employ adjusters who seek bribes before
raising initial offers." Strange indeed, if indeed true. As to the
poverty programs, Mayer makes the interesting point that the zealous
people who run them have a tendency to go pretty far out in their
insistence on the "rights" of their welfare-client clients, and even to
criticize the Legal Aid Societies, which they accuse of being establishment-minded or property-oriented. This (again if true) is an interesting
progression from the situation noticed a few years ago of the Legal Aid
attorneys in criminal cases being so concerned and single-minded in
their defense of the indigent accused as sometimes to overlook basic
social values and the necessities of the community. All these parts of
5 572 U.S. 335 (1963).

6 P. 260.
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the book establish again and again Mr. Mayer's skill at portraying the
human side of institutions which from a distance look cold and impersonal.
The third part of this bulky tome is headed "Business" and deals
variously with corporation lawyers, Washington lawyers, and lawyers
with even narrower specialties. It begins with a Mr. Dooley quotation
(new to this reviewer) which is absolutely priceless and not to be
spoiled by repetition here. In each of its segments the third part of
the book is notable mainly for its fine capsule histories. But most of
the rest of these chapters is rather well-worn material, smoothly written
but lacking anything really worthwhile, except perhaps in the descriptions of the few tight specialties like customs law, patent law, copyright
law, practice before certain Federal administrative agencies, and the like.
Equally trite are "The Business of the Courts," "Personality of the
Judge," and "The Supreme Court." After you have read for a while,
after you have admired the professional polish and readability of the
style, you begin to discover the various parts of the method. Mr.
Mayer has done a lot of reading, comparatively little observing in the
courts, and then, talking with people here and there (they sound like a
lot of people, but there are 350,000 lawyers and judges in this country),
he has picked up assorted truths, rumors and cliches. So assiduous has
he been in lining up canards that he repeats even this one: "It is generally believed in New York that a contribution of at least $10,000 to a
political party is necessary before anyone will be nominated for a
judgeship." On the contrary, it is believed by this reviewer, whose
knowledge of New York courts and judges is not only beyond Mr.
Mayer's but beyond compare, that no such thing is true or anywhere
near true, that anyone who believes it would also swallow whole the
"K. of C. Oath" and the "Protocols of Zion," and that an author who
repeats such nonsense (together with the casual intimation that New
York City's criminal court judges are believed to be "naturally corrupt") does a disservice to his readers and indicts himself as a rumormonger.
While on the subject of errors, let it be noted that this book contains its full share. The author tells at one point that in New York a
Sheriff's jury serves "in cases where the sanity of a public officer has
been challenged." He errs greatly in more important areas. For
example, his treatment and concept of "natural law" is naive and unin7 P. 479.
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formed: "the essence of natural law is the idea that God would want
justice done in the individual case." 8
In sum, this book is charming and interesting, but not great. It is
a product of great writing skill and enormous diligence in talking to
people all over the country, in listing scattered opinions, and in
collecting scattered quotes. But our hypothetical intelligent layman
seriously interested in examining the laws and the lawyers and the
courts must add to this heavy meal a large grain of salt, perhaps by
combining a reading of Mayer's book with some others, like Griswold's
Law and Lawyers in the United States, or Karlen's Anglo-American
CriminalJustice, or Hurst's Lawmakers.
Charles S. Desmond*
8 P. 125.
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